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ABSTRACT
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have pref-
erences over the set of candidates, and candidates make strategic
decisions about whether to run an electoral campaign or withdraw
from the election, in order to manipulate the outcome according to
their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of
strategic candidacy games to scenarios where candidates may find
it harmful for their reputation to withdraw from the election and
would only do so if their withdrawal changes the election outcome
for the better; otherwise, they would be keen to run the campaign.
We study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria in the
resulting class of games, both analytically and empirically, and
compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model. Our
results demonstrate that while in the worst case there may be none
or multiple, bad quality equilibria, on average, these games have a
unique, optimal equilibrium state.
KEYWORDS
Computational Social Choice; Algorithmic Game-Theory; Voting;
Strategic Candidacy
1 INTRODUCTION
In spite of its now distant relevance to the current affairs of the US,
the presidential campaign of the year 2000 continues to stir much
debate and discussion. It is a common opinion that the presence of
the “Green Party” candidate, Ralph Nader, had contributed to Al
Gore’s loss to George W. Bush. Nader is thought to have “siphoned
away” a pivotal amount of votes from Gore. Taking into account the
fact that Gore’s Democratic party was politically closer to Nader’s
own stance, the latter’s decision to campaign appears against this
background to be counter-intuitive, counter-productive and, even,
irrational. Perhaps more surprising is the observation, particularly
by political science research, that Nader’s behaviour is not unique.
For instance, Bol et al [2015] note that the number of candidates in
political elections under Plurality or Pluralitywith runoff schemes is
typically higher than what the equilibrium analysis of the standard
game-theoretic model would predict.
However, this latter, formal, study also suggest that such be-
haviour may not be as irrational as first impressions suggest. Rather,
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it is the matter of the standard models not addressing additional
benefits candidates may reap from an election campaign. Benefits
that do not depend on the election outcome. Both independent
candidates and parties are, quoting from Bol etal [2015], “motivated
by other goals than winning, such as the activation of a local party
section, the possibility of raising public awareness about certain
issues, (...) or increasing their visibility.” The last point is partic-
ularly important from a long-term perspective, as “because they
participate in other elections, parties need constant visibility and
are likely to endorse a candidate for election (...), even if he has no
chance of winning”.
In this work, we take these “other goals” into account and define
a game-theoretic model for strategic candidacy, termed the keen
candidacy game. Our model prescribes that in addition to the utility
that a candidate draws from an election outcome, she gets an addi-
tional reward if she runs the campaign. As we will show, this indeed
rationalises keen, zealous candidate participation. Furthermore, we
show that even smallest amounts of rewards for zeal significantly
impact candidate participation. What’s more, even if a party system
is considered instead of a set of independent candidates, rewarded
zeal can stabilise the elections by making candidate participation
an equilibrium strategy. Going beyond rationalising the behaviour
of politicians, however, by presenting a novel modification of can-
didacy games we complement the research on one of the hotter
topics in the AI community.
Indeed, strategic candidacy in voting scenarios has attracted
much attention of recent. The problem arises when potential can-
didates have their own preferences over possible outcomes of the
election and are able to strategically decide whether to run in the
election or withdraw/abstain. The latter choice was adopted by the
Socialist Party during one of the recent regional elections in France.
Unable to win, the Socialist Party preferred to withdraw and ensure
the success of a centrist candidate against the right-wing National
Front.
Such scenarios have been formalised as strategic games [5] and
their equilibrium properties have been studied in a number of
works [3, 6–8, 10, 13, 14, 16]. A common point of all these works is
that the game-theoretic model assumes that the payoff of a player
(i.e., a potential candidate) depends only on the outcome of the
election: a candidate prefers a state s of the game to another state
t if and only if she prefers the candidate winning in s to the can-
didate winning in t. Unfortunately, as our motivating scenario of
Nader-Bush-Gore and, more generally, political science research
suggest, this outcome centred reward assumption appears inaccu-
rate and insufficient for real world domains. Indeed, candidates
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derive additional value from the their participation, independently
of the elections’ outcome. This additional value from running an
electoral campaign can be negative (the campaign incurs some cost)
or positive (participating in the election gives the candidate an
opportunity to advertise his party or political platform and thus
raises his profile/reputation). The former (negative) bias for partici-
pation has been studied in [11] considering a strategic candidacy
model with so-called “lazy” candidates. In this work, we complete
the study by considering the opposite (positive) bias.
In our keen candidacy game (KCG) model the utility that a candi-
date draws from an election outcome is augmented by an additional
reward if she runs the campaign. This reward may be relatively
small compared to the utility gap between two different outcomes,
but need not always be so, as the Nader-Bush-Gore events demon-
strate. We therefore consider several variants of our model, depend-
ing on whether the value of the bias for participation is small (more
precisely, smaller than all differences between a candidate’s val-
ues for two different outcomes), large (more precisely, larger than
all differences between a candidate’s values for two different out-
comes), or medium (larger than some value differences but smaller
than some others). We will also focus on a specific subcase of the
medium bias model, where candidates are partitioned into parties,
and are willing to run if and only if it does not prevent their party
from winning.
We study the properties of pure strategy Nash equilibria in this
class of games, and find significant differences with the standard
(unbiased) model of strategic candidacy. Specifically, while in the
standard model the existence of a Condorcet winner guarantees the
existence of equilibria, in the keen candidacy games this is no longer
true. Similarly, while for the Copeland voting rule equilibria always
exist even in the absence of a Condorcet winner, keen candidacy
games under Copeland may possess no equilibrium states.
Given this, we focus then on the question of how the system can
be stabilised. Intuitively, by increasing the participation reward we
should arrive at the state where everyone is keen to participate,
so that “all in" is an equilibrium. Indeed, this intuition works for
a large bias. In other cases, we provide bounds on the number of
equilibria (for the multi-party case, in particular, these bounds are
implied by a characterisation of its Nash equilibria), and on the
quality of equilibria.
Finally, we perform simulations with random data, which demon-
strate most encouraging results. Specifically, while in the worst
case there may be instances with none, many and/or bad quality
equilibria, on average (and in fact, for a vast majority of instances)
we have a unique and optimal (“all in”) equilibrium already for small
values of the participation bias. Moreover, while larger rewards
lead to predictions that are not very interesting (since it is typically
the case that all candidates run), the setting with smaller rewards
offers a better prediction power: first, it almost always leads to a
small number of equilibria; second, it seems to agree with what is
observed in real elections—the number of candidates at equilibrium
is typically larger than in the standard model, but does not always
converge into the “all in” state.
2 MODEL
There is a set of potential candidates C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm } and a
set of voters V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn } such that C ∩V = ∅. Each voter
v ∈ V has a preference order ≻v∈ L(C) where L(C) is the set of all
linear orders over C . The list of orders PV = (≻v )v ∈V is called the
voters’ preference profile.
An election proceeds as follows. First, a subset of candidatesA ⊆
C announce that they participate in the election; we refer toA as the
actual candidates. Then, each voter v ∈ V reports his preferences
over the active candidates, which are obtained by restricting ≻v to
A. It is assumed that all voters report their preferences sincerely.
Finally, a voting rule r takes the set A and the voters’ preferences
as input, and outputs a candidate w ∈ A; this candidate is called
the election winner. Ties are broken according to a predetermined
order of the candidates, denoted as ◁. Common voting rules are:
Positional scoring rules. Such rules are associated with a scoring
vector (s1, ..., sm ) where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm and s1 > sm . If a
voter ranks a candidate at the j-th position, the candidate gets a
score of sj from this vote, and his total score is the sum of scores
over all the votes. The candidate with the highest score (with ties
broken according to ◁) wins the election. The most popular repre-
sentative of this family of rules is Plurality with the scoring vector
(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
Condorcet-consistent rules. A candidate x beats a candidate y,
if a majority of voters rank x above y in PV . A candidate x is a
Condorcet winner if x beats y for all y ∈ C \ {x}. A voting rule r is
Condorcet-consistent if r (PV ) = {x} whenever there is a (unique)
Condorcet winner x for PV . The most popular representative of
this family is Copeland that elects the candidate x maximising |{y ∈
C |x beats y}|.
While voters are assumed to sincerely report their preferences,
candidates make strategic decisions about whether to run in the
election, based on their own preferences over the set C . Formally,
each candidate c ∈ C has two available actions: 1 (run) and 0
(abstain), and is endowed with a preference order ≻c over C; the
list PC = (≻c )c ∈C is referred to as the candidates’ preference profile.
A candidate c ∈ C has self-supporting preferences if c ≻c x for all
x ∈ C \ {c}. Indeed, in settings with keen candidates it is natural to
assume that they have such preferences; importantly, our negative
results also hold for this special case.
A keen candidate would only withdraw his candidacy if that
would change the election outcome for the better; however, if his
withdrawal has no effect on the election outcome, he prefers to
participate. In this paper, we will be particularly interested in the
effect of the rate of this bias on the candidates’ behaviour. To this
end, it is convenient to equip the candidates with cardinal utilities,
which are consistent with their preference orders. That is, each
candidate c has a utility functionuc : C → R such thatuc (x) > uc (y)
if and only if x ≻c y. Additionally, there is a bias for participation,
ϵ ≥ 0.
Different value ranges of ϵ , visualised in Figure 1, define the
following cases of our model:
Zero bias, ϵ = 0: in this case the game is isomorphic to the standard
model of strategic candidacy where a player prefers one strategy
profile over the other solely based on his preference order over the
candidates.
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Figure 1: Possible values of ϵ
Small bias, ϵ < minc,x,y∈C,x,y |uc (x) − uc (y)|: in this case the
participation bias never overrides a candidate’s preference between
two outcomes of the election.
Medium bias, defined as minc,x,y∈C,x,y |uc (x) − uc (y)| < ϵ <
maxc,x,y∈C,x,y |uc (x) − uc (y)|: the participation bias has an inter-
mediate value that sometimes overrides a candidate’s preference
between two outcomes, but not always.
Large bias, ϵ > maxc,x,y∈C,x,y |uc (x) − uc (y)|: in this case the
participation bias overrides everything else.
As a particularly interesting case of the medium bias model, we
consider a typical scenario in the political scene, where the candi-
dates are divided into parties and only the election of a candidate
that belongs to another party makes a difference for them. For-
mally, we say that the set of candidatesC is partitioned into parties
P1, . . . , Pk such that Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ and ∪ki=1Pi = C . We denote x ∼ y
if candidates x and y belong to the same party, and for each candi-
date c ∈ C let P(c) be the party that contains c . Now, in addition to
the self-supporting preference assumption, we assume that each
candidate c ranks the members of his party over the other parties’
members: i.e., x ≻c y for all x ∈ P(c) and y < P(c). Also, we assume
that each candidate is keen to run the electoral campaign except if
it ruins the chances of his own party to win. For all c,x ,y ∈ C we
thus have:
0 < ϵ < uc (x ) − uc (y) ∀x ∈ P (c), y < P (c) (1)
ϵ > |uc (x ) − uc (y) | ∀x, y ∈ P (c) ∨ x, y < P (c) (2)
Now, the tuple ⟨C,V , PV , r ,◁, (uc )c ∈C , ϵ⟩ defines what we term
the keen candidacy game (KCG), as follows. KCG is a strategic game,
in which the set of players is C and each player’s set of actions
is {0, 1}. We denote the action (strategy) of a player c ∈ C by sc ;
the vector s = (sc )c ∈C is called a strategy profile. We identify a
strategy profile s with the set of actual candidates A(s) = {c ∈ C |
sc = 1}. Consequently, each profile defines an outcome w(s) ∈ C ,
which is simply the outcome of the voting rule r by voters in V
over candidates in A(s) when A(s) is not empty (with ties broken
according to ◁), and when A(s) = ∅, the outcome is c◁—the highest
ranked candidate according to ◁. For a candidate c and a strategy
profile s, we denote s+c = A(s)∪ {c} if sc = 0 and s−c = A(s) \ {c}
if sc = 1.
The utility of a player c from a profile s is given by
Uc (s) = uc (w (s)) + bc (s) (3)
where bc (s) = ϵ if sc = 1 and bc (s) = 0 if sc = 0.
We will be interested in (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of KCGs.
Recall that a strategy profile s is said to be an equilibrium if no player
in the game can profitably deviate from that profile. Formally, given
a game Γ = Γ
(
C,V , PV , r ,◁, (uc )c ∈C , ϵ
)
, we say that a strategy
profile s is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of Γ if for every
candidate c ∈ C ,Uc (s) ≥ Uc (t) where t is the strategy profile given
by tx = sx for x ∈ C \ {c}, and tc = 1 − sc .
3 WORST CASE ANALYSIS
We start with exploring the properties of KCGs analytically. Specif-
ically, we observe several crucial differences with the standard
model, discuss the number of possible equilibria and consider the
special case with a multi-party structure.
3.1 Small bias model vs. unbiased model
For the unbiasedmodel, it was shown that under Condorcet-consistent
rules any subset of candidates that contains a Condorcet winner (if
one exists) defines a PSNE profile [10]. In fact, as we show below, if
the set of candidates has a Condorcet winner, then the correspond-
ing candidacy game has a PSNE under any voting rule, as long as
this rule respects majorities for the case of two candidates; more-
over, there is always an equilibrium where the Condorcet winner
is elected.
Observation 1. Let Γ be a standard candidacy game (i.e., ϵ = 0),
with an arbitrary voting rule r respecting majority when there are
two candidates, and assume there is a Condorcet winner c . Then, the
singleton {c} is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ.
However, when the candidates are keen to participate in the
election, this is no longer true, even for the small participation
bias model. Quite the contrary, as we demonstrate in the following
Examples 3.1 and 3.2, not only a Condorcet winner may lose the
election in an equilibrium profile, there may be no equilibria at all,
despite the existence of a Condorcet winner.
Example 3.1. Consider a KCG with 6 voters and 4 candidates
{a,b, c,d}, where r is Plurality, PV and PC are as follows (with any
consistent utilities uc , c ∈ C) and ϵ is small: 1
PV : 2 a c b d PC : a a b d c
2 b c a d b b a d c
1 d c a b c c a b d
1 d c b a d d a b c
Here, candidate c is a Condorcet winner. However, the profile {c} is
not a PSNE, as any other candidate wants to join the election, even
if this would not change the outcome. In fact, the only equilibrium
is {a,b, c,d} and the winner is a. That is, even though the game
has a PSNE, there is no equilibrium profile in which the Condorcet
winner wins the election!
In fact, in contrast with Observation 1, a single candidate can
never define an equilibrium of a keen candidacy game.
Observation 2. In a KCG Γ, an equilibrium profile must contain
at least two active candidates.
Moreover, in contrast with Observation 1 for standard games, a
KCG may not have a PSNE, even in the presence of a Condorcet
winner, and even for a small participation bias.
Example 3.2. Consider a KCG with 4 voters and 4 candidates
{a,b, c,d}, where r is Plurality and PV , PC are as follows (with any
1In our examples, when the tie-breaking ordering ◁ is not specified it is assumed to
be lexicographic/alphabetical. The first column in PV indicates the number of voters
casting the different ballots.
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consistent utilities uc , c ∈ C , and a small ϵ):
PV : 1 a d c b PC : a a d c b
1 b a d c b b a d c
1 c b a d c c b a d
1 d a b c d d a b c
In this game, candidate a is a Condorcet winner. However, no strat-
egy profile is stable under unilateral player deviations. Indeed, by
Observation 2, singleton sets are not PSNE. Now, candidate a would
like to join the election at any of the profiles {b, c}, {b,d}, {c,d},
{b, c,d}; candidate b would join {a, c}, {a,d}, {a, c,d}; c would join
{a,b} but leave from {a,b, c,d}; and d would join {a,b, c} but leave
from {a,b,d}. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium in this game!
Even more interestingly, there is an analogous example for the
Copeland rule, for which in the standard model a Nash equilib-
rium is guaranteed to exist even in the absence of a Condorcet
winner [10].
Example 3.3. Consider a KCGwith 4 candidates {a,b, c,d}, where
r is the Copeland rule, and PV is such that in pairwise elections
candidate a beats candidate b; candidate b beats candidate c ; c beats
a and d ; and d beats a and b. The candidates’ preference profile PC
is as follows (as before, assume any consistent utilities uc , c ∈ C ,
and a small ϵ):
PC : a a d b c
b b c a d
c c d b a
d d a b c
The score of candidates a and b is 1, and of c and d is 2; hence,
candidate c wins the election by the lexicographic tie-breaking.
Here, all strategy profiles are prone to deviations, and this is includ-
ing the set {a, c,d} containing the Copeland winner c and all the
candidates beaten by him in pairwise elections, which was used to
prove the PSNE existence in the standard model. Indeed, candidate
b wants to join {a, c,d} and obtain the reward for participation,
even though his presence does not change the election’s winner.
Moreover, even when a PSNE does exist, the Copeland winner
of the full profile may not be an equilibrium winner.
Example 3.4. Consider a KCGwith 4 candidates {a,b, c,d}, where
r is Copeland, and PV is such that in pairwise elections candidate
a beats b and c; b beats c and d ; and d beats a and c . Hence, the
score of candidates a, b and d is 2, the score of candidate c is 0, and
candidate a wins the election. As for the candidates’ preferences, we
only need to specify that candidate b prefers d over a, to show that
the full set {a,b, c,d} is not a PSNE (as b wants to leave), and the
only equilibrium is {a, c,d} where d (but not a) wins the election.
3.2 Medium bias: multi-party elections
We now move towards the multi-party model with a medium bias,
as described in Section 2.
We first observe that in an equilibrium profile (if one exists),
each party must be actively represented.
Observation 3. If s is a PSNE of a KCG Γ satisfying (1) and (2),
then for any party P , A(s) ∩ P , ∅.
Furthermore, as we show below, a profile s is a PSNE of a KCG
with a multi-party structure, if and only if all losing parties are
represented in s in full and every inactive candidate makes his
party lose the election should he decide to run.
Theorem 3.5. Let Γ be a KCG satisfying (1) and (2). Then, s is a
PSNE of Γ iff the following conditions are met:
(i) ∀P such that w (s) < P , P ⊆ A(s);
(ii) ∀P such that w (s) < P and ∀c ∈ P , w (s − c) < P ;
(iii) ∀c < A(s), w (s + c) ≁ c .
Proof. First, let s be a PSNE of Γ. Then, condition (i) is implied
by the same arguments as Observation 3.
Assume on the contrary that condition (ii) is not satisfied: i.e.,
there are P and c ∈ P such thatw(s) < P andw(s− c) ∈ P . But then,
by (1), Uc (s − c) = uc (w(s + c)) > uc (w(s)) + ϵ = Uc (s); that is, c
has an incentive to withdraw from the election, a contradiction.
Assume on the contrary that condition (iii) is not satisfied: i.e.,
there is c < A(s) such that w(s + c) ∼ c . By condition (i), we have
that w(s) ∼ c . But then, by (2), Uc (s + c) = uc (w(s + c)) + ϵ >
uc (w(s)) = Uc (s); that is, c has an incentive to join the election, a
contradiction.
Conversely, assume that all three conditions hold and show that
s is a PSNE. Letw(s) = w and let c ∈ P(w), that is, c ∼ w . If c = w ,
thenUc (s) = uc (c)+ϵ is maximal and c has no incentive to withdraw.
If c , w and c ∈ A(s), then Uc (s) = uc (w) + ϵ > uc (w(s − c)) =
Uc (s − c), where the inequality holds by (1) if w(s − c) ≁ w or by
(2) ifw(s − c) ∼ w ; again, candidate c has no incentive to withdraw.
If c < A(s), then c has no incentive to join the election by condition
(iii) and equation (1). Now, let c < P(w). In this case, c ∈ A(s)
by condition (i), and by condition (ii) and equation (1), he has no
incentive to withdraw from the election. □
However, yet there are instances of multi-party KCGs where the
three conditions stated in Theorem 3.5 are not satisfied and hence,
the existence of PSNE is not guaranteed.
Example 3.6. Consider a multi-party KCG with two parties P1 =
{a,b} and P2 = {c,d}. The voting rule is (partially) described by
the following choice function:
a b ab
c a c c
d d b d
cd a b d
That is, if the set of active candidate is given by {a, c} then the
winner of the election is candidate a; if the active candidates are
{a,b, c,d} then d is elected, and so on.
We now check that for any strategy profile s, one of the con-
ditions (i), (ii) or (iii) of Theorem 3.5 is violated: (1) {a, c}, {b, c},
{a,d} and {b,d} violate condition (i) (for instance, in {a, c}, candi-
date d has an incentive to join); (2) {a, c,d}, {b, c,d}, {a,b,d} and
{a,b, c,d} violate condition (ii): in the former two profiles, candi-
date c wants to withdraw, in the latter two, a wants to withdraw;
(3) {a,b, c} violates condition (iii) (d wants to join). Hence, there is
no PSNE in this game.
Note that the characterization in Theorem 3.5 does not provide
us with an efficient algorithm to decide whether a PSNE exists
in a given KCG, as each party P has exponentially many subsets.
However, if there is a constant bound on the size of the parties, this
can be decided in poly-time.
Corollary 3.7. In a multi-party KCG Γ, all PSNE can be found
in time O
(∑k
i=1 2
|Pi |
)
. Therefore, finding all PSNE (and a fortiori
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deciding whether there exists one) is fixed-parameter tractable in
maxi |Pi |.
3.3 Large bias for participation
Finally, we observe that if the value of the bias is large, a PSNE is
guaranteed to exist; moreover, it is unique.
Theorem 3.8. Let Γ be a KCG with ϵ > maxc,x,y∈C |uc (x) −
uc (y)|. Then, the full strategy profile (1, . . . , 1) where all the candi-
dates are running, is the unique PSNE of Γ.
The proof of Theorem 3.8 is straightforward, since the bias for
participation prevails the preferences over the candidates.
However, while the existence and uniqueness of PSNE is a very
desirable property, Theorem 3.8 assumes an unrealistically large
bias for participation. A natural question is therefore, by how much
this value can be reduced, yet not eliminating or multiplying equi-
librium profiles. As it turns out though, in the worst case this is as
good as one can get.
3.4 Number of equilibria
To investigate further the question of the number of equilibria, it is
useful to remark that the game can be encoded by the hypercube of
dimensionm. In the unbiased case, it is easy to see that there can be
up to 2m−1 equilibria (no more, due to some structural properties
of the hypercube, with the bound being reached when a candidate
wins whenever he runs).
Even a small participation bias decreases this bound.
Theorem 3.9. Let Γ be a KCG withm ≥ 1 candidates and ϵ > 0.
Then, the number of PSNE is at most (m−2)2
m−1+1
m−1 .
Proof. The deviation graph constitutes an oriented hypercube
where (1) each node has exactlym neighbours in the hypercube, (2)
each equilibrium has only ingoing edges, (3) any node (except the
one representing the empty state) must have at least one ingoing
edge (it cannot be the case that all the candidates want to leave,
since at least the winner is willing to stay). Now, using a counting
argument, assume δ equilibria: this inducesmδ+2m−δ−1 edges. As
there are overallm2m−1 edges in the hypercube, the result follows.
□
For a medium bias, we focus again on the multi-party elections.
According to Theorem 3.5, a Nash equilibrium in this case is of the
form St ∪(∪t ′,tPt ′), where the winner is of party Pt and conditions
(ii) and (iii) are met. Let |Pt | =mt , and δt the number of equilibria
where the winning party is Pt . When St ⊆ Pt , we denote (St )+ =
St ∪ (∪t ′,tPt ′).
Lemma 3.10. Let Γ be a multi-party KCG. Then, δt ≤ 2mt−1.
Proof. Let St ⊆ Pt and c ∈ Pt \ St . Now, (1) if w((St )+) < Pt ,
then c joining (St )+ is a profitable deviation, (2) ifw((St )+) ∈ Pt and
w((St )+ ∪ {c}) ∈ Pt , then c joining (St )+ is a profitable deviation,
and (3) if w((St )+) ∈ Pt and w((St )+ ∪ {c}) < Pt , then c leaving
(St )+ ∪ {c} is a profitable deviation. Therefore, there is either a
deviation from (St )+ to (St )+ ∪ {c} or vice versa.
Consider the graph whose set of edges is 2Pt and that contains
a vertex from S to S ′ if there is a profitable deviation from (S)+ to
(S ′)+. Due to the above observation, the number of edges in the
graph is mt .2mt−1. Now, if S is an Nash equilibrium, then there
are no outgoing edges from S and, because of (1), there are mt
ingoing edges from S . Thus, we have mtδt ≤ mt 2mt−1, that is,
δt ≤ 2mt−1. □
Corollary 1. A multi-party KCG has ≤ ∑kt=1 2mt−1 PSNE.
We now show that for Plurality (but more generally for all scor-
ing rules identified in [15], for which every choice function can be
implemented by some voting profile) this upper bond is reached
asymptotically form ≥ 2.
Proposition 3.11. Let Γ be a multi-party KCG withm ≥ 2. For
the Plurality rule, there are profiles for which the number of PSNE is
at least (∑kt=1 2mt−1 ) − 2k .
Proof. We first specify a profile for which the bound is reached
asymptotically. We define the following constraints:
A(t, St) : w ((St )+) ∈ Pt , ∀t = 1 . . . k, St ⊂ Pt ,mt − |St | even.
B(t, St) : w ((St )+) < Pt , ∀t = 1 . . . k, St ⊂ Pt ,mt − |St | odd.
C(t1, t2, St1, xt2 ) :w ((St1 )+\ {xt2 }) ∈ Pt1 , ∀t1, t2 = 1 . . . k , t2 , t1, St1 ⊂
Pt1, xt2 ∈ Pt2 .
Is is easy (even if tedious) to verify that these constraints are
globally consistent (we omit this part of the proof).
Now, recall that with Plurality (and most scoring rules, with
the noticeable exception of Borda) we can implement every choice
function by some profile [15]. Thus, we can build a profile satisfying
all (A-B-C) constraints. From Theorem 2, for all t = 1 . . .k , St ⊂ Pt ,
mt − |St | even, (St )+ is a Nash equilibrium: condition (i) holds
because w((St )+) ∈ Pt due to (A), condition (ii) holds because if
any candidate from Pt joins, then the winner is no longer in Pt due
to the (B), and (iii) holds because of the (C) constraint. The number
of PSNE is therefore
∑k
t=1
∑ ⌊mt −12 ⌋
i=1
( mt
mt−2i
)
.
Now, for mt odd,
∑ ⌊mt −12 ⌋
i=1
( mt
mt−2i
)
= 2mt−1 − 1, and for mt
even,
∑ ⌊mt −12 ⌋
i=1
( mt
mt−2i
)
= 2mt−1 − 2. Hence, there are at least∑k
t=1(2mt−1 − 2) = (
∑k
t=1 2
mt−1) − 2k PSNE. □
3.5 Quality of equilibria
The quality of equilibria is usually measured by the price of anarchy
(PoA) [9], that compares the (worst possible) value of some social
objective function at equilibrium and optimum states. In the con-
text of strategic candidacy, inspired by [2], it is natural to compare
the initial scores (i.e., when all the candidates are present) of the
winners at the (worst) PSNE and the OPT (“all in”) profiles respec-
tively. However, because this absolute value of difference of score
may highly depend on the voting rule used, we normalize it by
dividing it by the maximum score that can be attained with the rule,
ms(Γ)–that is, n for plurality andm − 1 for Copeland. 2 Formally,
let Sc (s) denote the score obtained by a candidate c ∈ A(s). The
(additive) price of anarchy of a KCG Γ is then defined by:
PoA(Γ) = max
PSNE of Γ
{Sw (OPT )(OPT ) − Sw (PSNE)(OPT )/ms(Γ)} (4)
Theorem 3.12. Let Γ be a KCG with n voters. Then, PoA(Γ) = 1/2
for Plurality; and PoA(Γ) = 1 for Copeland, as n andm grow. This
holds for any ϵ smaller than a large bias.
2Note that using a multiplicative version of PoA has it own caveat, as scores can be
null.
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Proof. We prove for odd n under Plurality, the even case is
similar. The upper bound is straightforward. If PoA(Γ) > 12 then the
winner of the OPT state gets the majority of votes under Plurality,
and if he does not run in the equilibrium profile, he will join the
election and win—a contradiction.
To show the lower bound, we use the following example with
n+5
2 candidates {w1,w2,a1, . . . ,a n+12 }:
PV PC
1 . . . 1 1 . . . 1 w1 w2 a1 . . . a n+1
2
w1 . . . w1 a1 . . . a n+1
2
w1 w2 a1 . . . a n+1
2
a1 . . . a n−1
2
w2 . . . w2
.
.
.
.
.
. w2 . . . w2
w1 . . . w1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
.
w2 . . . w2
.
.
.
.
.
. w2
.
.
. w1 . . . w1
In this game, w1 is the OPT winner with the score of n−12 . Yet,
he is the least favourite candidate for a1, . . . ,a n+1
2
, and in the PSNE
{w1,w2},w2 (with initial score of 0) wins.
As for Copeland, remark that w1 beatsm − 1 candidates, wins
in all-in, and is only beaten byw2, with score 1. But (w1,w2) is an
equilibrium.
Finally, to see that our construction remains valid for any ϵ
smaller than a large bias, observe that w1 is the very last choice
of candidates a1 . . . an+12 , the ones who could enter in equilibrium(w1,w2). □
So essentially, in terms of scores, strategic candidacy can yield bad
outcomes, irrespective of the value of ϵ : an equilibrium where the
winner would have a very low compared to the ones of the winner
in the initial situation. Another natural measure would also be to
compare the rankings obtained by candidates in these situations.
The conclusions would be similar: by inspecting our construction,
it can be seen that the winner in equilibrium (w1,w2) may be the
one with the worst score, the last one in terms of ranking.
4 AVERAGE CASE ANALYSIS
Given that the existence and uniqueness of KCG equilibria can
only be guaranteed by a large participation bias, it is crucial to
understand how often instances with none or multiple PSNE can
be expected in practice. To this end, we performed extensive simu-
lations with randomly generated data.
4.1 Setup
Voting rules: We used Plurality and Copeland.
Number of candidates and voters: The number of candidates m
ranged from 3 to 8. The number of voters n is set to 101, although
we obtain the same results for larger n (note also, that increasing
the number of voters does not significantly affect the computation
time, as the crucial parameter for finding the number of equilibria
ism but not n).
Generation of ordinal preferences: Both voters’ and candidates’ pref-
erences were generated using an impartial culture (i.e. drawn uni-
formly from all possible orderings), with the constraint of being
self-supporting for the candidates.
Cardinal utility functions for the candidates: We first generated
random orderings as the preferences of both voters and candidates.
Then, to determine cardinal utility functions for the candidates, we
used Borda utilities: a candidate c has a utility ofm − 1 points if
his top choice is elected (i.e., himself),m − 2 points if his second
best choice is elected, and so on, and has a zero utility if his last
choice wins. In addition, he has a reward of ϵ if he participates in
the election.
Values for ϵ : Since we used the integer Borda utilities, for any ϵ ∈
(0, 1), our model will have exactly the same set of equilibria, since
all these values affect the final utility of each player in the same way.
Similarly, all the values of ϵ in (1, 2) induce the same game. Hence,
we only needed to pick a single value from each such interval, so
we used the set of values {0, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, . . . ,m − 1 + 0.5}.
4.2 Results
We report our findings for the Plurality and the Copeland rules. In
both cases, and for ease of presentation and readability, we present
figures for instances withm = 5 candidates. The same conclusions
can be drawn for all other instances we explored, with different
number of candidates.
Plurality. Figure 2 shows for each value of ϵ the distribution in
terms of the number of equilibria. Recall that with m = 5 and
with Borda utilities, as noted in the previous subsection, it only
makes sense to consider values of ϵ below 4, thus we have used
ϵ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5}. The second axis shows the number of
equilibria in each instance. Recall that we can have at most 16 =
2m−1 PSNE. Finally, the third axis shows, for each ϵ and for each
possible number of equilibria, the percentage of instances that had
these many equilibria, under this ϵ (averaged over 10,000 instances
for each value of ϵ).
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Figure 2: Plurality, 5 candidates, impartial culture
When there is no bias for participation, i.e., ϵ = 0, we see that a
quite likely situation (which occurs about 25% of the time) is to have
the maximum possible number of equilibria (in this case, 16), with
a bell-shaped distribution for other values. It is also particularly
unlikely to have an instance without an equilibrium (although
theoretically possible).
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As soon as we introduce the smallest possible bias ϵ , we see
an interesting phase transition. The distribution now concentrates
massively on a single equilibrium (typically, it concentrates on the
equilibrium where all the candidates participate). At the same time,
the proportion of instances without equilibria at all becomes signif-
icant (about 10%). Clearly, as the bias increases, the figure shows
that it becomes more and more likely to have a single equilibrium.
E.g, when ϵ = 1.5, this holds for more than 92% of the instances).
Copeland. Figure 3 shows an analogous picture for the equilibria
under the Copeland rule. We also observe a phase transition occur-
ring again as soon as ϵ becomes positive. However when ϵ = 0, the
likelihood of having the maximum possible number of equilibria
is much higher—75% compared to 25% under Plurality (remember
that the existence of equilibria is guaranteed for Copeland when
ϵ = 0). On the other hand, a small bias leads in most cases to a
single equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Copeland, 5 candidates, impartial culture
Finally, we comment on the additive price of anarchy observed
in our experiments. Recall that this is the largest difference in the
score (either Plurality or Copeland score) between the winner if all
candidates are in and a winner at an equilibrium state (the—very
few—instances without PSNE were ignored). We see that the PoA
is consistently very low on average, tending to 0 as ϵ grows:
Bias ϵ 0 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5
Plurality 0.022 0.011 0.005 0.001 0
Copeland 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0
Thus, despite the higher theoretical bounds, in the vast majority
of instances our model significantly refines the set of possible PSNE,
converging to states with desirable properties, such as (typically)
full participation in the election, that leads to socially preferable
outcomes.
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
As we have started with a real world scenario, it was important
to us to arrive at a model family that supports and rationalises
the Nader-Bush-Gore example. Akin to the way that [12] follows
the hunch exhibited by [18], we have incorporated the insight of
Bol etal [2015] into the the model of candidacy games. We have,
however, gone far beyond the simple rationalisation of zealous
candidate behaviour.
In this paper we have presented a study of strategic candidacy
games augmented with a positive participation bias, terming the
model keen candidacy games (KCGs). We break the range of possible
bias values into four categories, depending on how it relates to the
maximal and the minimal difference between election outcomes.
We find that even within the category of small biases, the set of
equilibria in KCGs is critically different from the standard non-
biased model. We present results on the number and the quality
of the equilibria in terms of price of anarchy. The latter explicitly
addresses the dangers of an overzealous candidate participation.
However, as our experiments suggest, in practice political zeal is
more likely to be a source of stability in the elections process –
ensuring the existence of a single “all in” equilibrium behaviour
with a socially preferable outcome. In this sense, our model suggests
that Nader’s participation was a sign of a stable political system.
Now, it is important to notice a certain parallel with voting bias
games (e.g. [4, 17]). In these games voters’ reward is also augmented
by a contextual bias, and negative bias is implemented in terms
that lead to abstention. It is natural, therefore, to expect that the
positive bias would also create a conceptual simile between the
voter and candidate game biases. However, the expectation is amiss.
Positively or “truth” biased voters, receive additional reward when
they can not influence the elections outcome and revert to express-
ing their innate preferences over candidates. In other words, the
bias concerns preference expression, but not the preference itself.
In case of KCGs the bias is at the core of a candidate’s preference
system. In a sense, KCG preferences are over a two dimensional
grid, and each candidate has to order all pairs of the form (winner,
participation bonus).
Now, although we have performed an extensive study of pos-
itively biased candidacy games, and our results have their merit,
they call for further research in new directions. In particular, we
would like to investigate parallel, simultaneous elections, such as
those that occur during primary elections. Besides a more complex
structure for a participation bias to interfere with, such linked elec-
tions open the possibility to discuss bias as an externality. That is,
a situation where the presence of a candidate in internal elections
of one party may play an invigoration or suppressing role on the
chances of candidates in other party elections.
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